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Abstract
We model a market for highly skilled workers, such as the academic job market. The
outputs of rm-worker matches are heterogeneous and common knowledge. Wage setting
is synchronous with search: rms simultaneously make one personalized o¤er each to
the worker of their choice. With large frictions (delay costs), e¢ cient coordination is
not possible, but for small frictions e¢ cient matching with Diamond-type monopsony
wages is an equilibrium.
1 Introduction
We consider labor markets for professionals, who are either nishing their training, or their
current performance is public information. They could be doctors, lawyers, MBAs, PhDs,
fund managers, athletes, musicians, chefs etc. The common (stylized) characteristic of these
markets is that the productivity of workers is both identity and match dependent. This
feature not only has implications for the e¢ ciency properties of the match, but also has
important consequences for the microstructure of the operation of the decentralized labor
This paper was written while I was visiting UC Santa Cruz. I am grateful for comments at seminar
presentations at Arizona State University, Stanford and UC Santa Cruz .
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market. Indeed, in our model  as often in real life1  the rms choose who to make a
personalized job o¤er to. This procedure would seem out of place if workers were homogeneous.
Our market is liable to su¤er from two types of ine¢ ciencies, caused by market imperfec-
tions:2 the coexistence of unlled vacancies and qualied job seekers (frictional unemploy-
ment); and mismatch, where workers could be reassigned to di¤erent jobs in a way to increase
aggregate production.3
The recently Nobelized search and matching theory has been the standard and rather
successful method for the analysis of labor markets, both theoretically and empirically.4 Our
contribution belongs to the family of complete information models within this literature. The
sub-eld can be split into two camps. One of them uses ex post wage setting: rst rms and
workers meet (according to some well-specied procedure, described via a matching function)
and once they are matched they negotiate the wages. These models typically exhibit a hold-
up-like feature, called the Diamond (1971) paradox: despite the existence of either unemployed
workers or unlled vacancies, the terms of trade (wages) are determined as if the negotiation
among the matched parties was taking place in isolation, with no outside opportunities, no
matter how inexpensive it is to switch partners. The alternative family of models has ex ante
wage setting, where the rms commit to wage o¤ers before the matching occurs (see Butters
(1977), Montgomery (1991), Peters (1991) and their followers5). Here hold up is no longer a
problem and the matching process is also more interesting, as now the workers can condition
1Even if actually workers apply rst, they typically use blanketapplication strategies, which e¤ectively
give the relevant choice over to the rms.
2Of course, there are many other ine¢ ciencies associated with the labor market, like structural unemploy-
ment, discrimination, distortions caused by labor laws etc.. However, these are not caused by the market
institution itself and hence are not subjects of this study.
3Note that this is a di¤erent denition of mismatch from Shimers (2007), which is closer to structural
unemployment, in a multimarket context.
4See Rogerson et al. (2005) and the Scientic Background on the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2010, for surveys.
5There is also a small literature, started by McAfee (1993), on competing mechanism designers, where
instead of wages, entire mechanisms (for wage determination) are posted by the rms.
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their search strategy on the posted wages, what then feeds back into the competition among
rms. The principal novelty we introduce6 is that wages are not determined either before or
after the matching. Rather, we have synchronous wage setting: each rm with a vacancy has
to addressits o¤er to a worker, thereby choosing wages and matches at the same time.
We start with the derivation of the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium for the case of
two rms (and at least two workers). When both rms would prefer to hire the same worker
and the discount factor is low, the equilibrium involves double mixing:mixed strategies are
used both to select the worker to target and for the wage o¤ered to the better worker. Due
to the double mixing, the outcome exhibits both (temporary) frictional unemployment and
(permanent) mismatch. Wages for the sought after worker are drawn from an interval. Its
lower bound is shown to be her continuation value when both rms have o¤ered to her. The
upper bound is the lowest competitive wage.
As the discount factor rises, the upper end of the support of the wage distribution for the
top worker does not rise above the lowest competitive wage, despite her increased bargaining
power and despite the fact that with a higher discount factor rms are more willing to poach;
as, if they are unsuccessful, they still have a signicant continuation value. The reason for this
is that the weaker rm still has the outside option of hiring the weaker worker, which limits
how much it is willing to bid for the better worker. The better workers improved bargaining
position manifests itself instead in that the lower bound of her equilibrium wage distribution
increases.
When the discount factor is su¢ ciently high, the equilibrium undergoes a metamorphosis:
the weaker rm gives up on trying to compete, and the equilibrium is an e¢ cient matching
with monopsony wages. While e¢ cient matching when frictions are still present is remarkable,
even more striking is that the equilibrium has a distinct Diamond (1971) paradox avor:
we have a nearly frictionless decentralized market leading to the monopsony prices. The
underlying logic is entirely di¤erent though, as we explain below, it has nothing to do with
the hold-up scenario.
6See our discussion of Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008) below.
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Let us return to the e¢ cient strategy prole, where each rm makes an exclusive o¤er
to its corresponding worker and hence wages are the monopsony ones. At rst glance, one
would think that this could not constitute an equilibrium. If both rms o¤er zero wages
then there seems to exist a protable deviation where the weaker rm o¤ers " to poach its
preferred worker. However, outbidding your competitor is not su¢ cient to obtain the services
of a worker. It is also necessary that the worker be willing to accept the highest wage. As
it happens, the fact that the worker was willing to accept zero in the putative equilibrium
does not imply that she would also accept a deviant o¤er of " > 0: The di¤erence is that, in
the rst case, rejecting the o¤er would only delay the inevitable, as no other rm would be
around to put an upward pressure on the wage. However, following the deviation, rejecting
both o¤ers would lead to a subgame where there are still two rms left. The continuation
value of the top worker following such a double rejection is the lower bound of the mixing
distribution, which we show to approach the (lowest) competitive wage as the discount factor
tends to 1. This e¤ect would make the incentive to poach disappear exactly at the limit (by
the very denition of the competitive wage).
Our model also includes a vettingcost, which plays an important role here. This cost is
incurred only once, as the rst binding o¤er is made to a worker. As a result, if following a
deviation by the weaker rm the better worker receives two o¤ers, her continuation value is
that of a game with these two rms, where the vetting cost of (only) this worker has already
been incurred by both rms. Such a game is biased in favor of the better worker, as rms now
need to pay a vetting cost to make an o¤er to the weaker worker but not if they continue to
bid for her. As a result, the upper bound of the wage distribution for the best worker shifts up
by the value of the vetting cost. That is, in the continuation game the highest possible wage
o¤ers are strictly higher than in the rst period. As the collapse of the mixing interval on the
upper bound happens here as well, a high enough discount factor leads to a situation where
the continuation value of the better worker is higher than the lowest competitive wage, the
highest wage the weaker rm is willing to pay her in the rst period. Consequently, poaching
cannot happen and we end up with the Diamond equilibrium.
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It is remarkable that it is exactly the improvement in the workersbargaining position that
leads to an equilibrium with the lowest possible wages. Because the workers are so powerful
when there is competition for them, the rms shy away from competition. Workers would
benet from being able to commit to accepting below competitive wages.
The characterization of equilibria becomes exceedingly di¢ cult as the number of rms
grows. Nevertheless, we show that the Diamond outcome continues to be an equilibrium
for an arbitrary number of rms, if the discount factor is su¢ ciently high. We can do that
because in the continuation following a unilateral deviation by a rm there are always only
two rms left since all the others will have traded according to the equilibrium strategies ,
which is exactly the situation we have already characterized.
We also show that to obtain the above result it does not matter the number of vacancies
rms have; or whether there are more workers than rms; or whether the workers can hold
on to an o¤er or not.
Finally, we also look at the case where rms can commit not to make a second o¤er to the
same worker. We show that the Diamond equilibrium is no longer possible, as the combination
of commitment and lack of direct competition eliminates the high continuation value for a
worker who receives two o¤ers. When there are only two rms, the equilibrium is the same
as without commitment (and low discount factor), with the only di¤erence that now workers
have a zero continuation value, so the support for the wage distribution starts at the workers
outside option, leading to a lower expected wage for the better worker.
1.1 A brief review of the closely related literature
The most relevant direct precursor to this contribution is De Fraja and Sákovics (2001). In
that paper we allowed for many-to-one matching (together with ex post price determination)
that potentially created local market conditions that reversed the aggregate ones. We have
shown how this could a¤ect the performance of a decentralized market. However, the matching
function was exogenously given there. In this paper we endogenize who matches with whom,
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while maintaining the possibility of market power reversal. In the literature with ex ante wage
setting mentioned above, not only is there no reversal, but one side of the market sets the
conditions of trade and the other chooses who to attempt to trade with. In the current model
the same side of the market takes both decisions, thereby changing the nature of competition.
Shi (2001) also presents a model with two-sided heterogeneity, where rms set wages and
they can specify the type of worker they would like to hire. The equilibrium is e¢ cient and
involves no competition for workers. His model di¤ers from ours in two major respects: First,
there is a large number of workers of each skill level. Consequently, targeting a skill level does
not imply targeting an individual. Second, there is free entry of rms, leading to zero prots
in equilibrium. This makes it easy to discourage poaching.
Bulow and Levin (2006) analyze the special case of our job market where the value of a
match is the product of the worker and rm productivities. They consider universal wages:
a rm must hire the best worker that shows up for the wage it has advertised. While this
is the opposite of targeting, their model provides an interesting benchmark to compare our
results to. Their unique (mixed strategy) equilibrium exhibits some mismatch but no frictional
unemployment. Wages are not only infra-competitive but they are compressed: the better
the worker the farther below competitive his wage is. Importantly, due to the relatively
high e¢ ciency of the matching, the rms benet from the losses of the workers: they earn
ultra-competitive prots.
The closest paper to ours is Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008). Though they do not have the
same motivation, they also present a model with targeted o¤ers in the context of an abstract
assignment problem and assuming a supermodular output matrix. The dynamic variant of the
model of Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008) is cleverly set-up in a way that avoids simultaneous
competition in equilibrium. By assuming that o¤ers to a worker are made once and for all and
that there is no cost of delay, they are able to construct (pure strategy) equilibria where only
a single rm makes an o¤er in each period. Note that their assumptions amount to giving the
last word to the rm moving later, implying that wage competition for a worker cannot occur,
as whoever attempts to overbid a follower will be matched by it anyway and hence will not
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be able to hire that worker. The main point of our model is to draw attention to the intrinsic
interest of (endogenous) instantaneous local competition in the dynamic context, which was
nessed by Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008).
Finally, we should mention that there exist centralized models of labor matching markets
which involve rms targeting workers and endogenous wages.7 The pioneer work in this area
is Crawford and Knoer (1981). Their model requires that a rm myopically always o¤er
to its most preferred worker at the goingwage vector, thereby enforcing competition and
ensuring a competitive outcome.
2 The model
There are M rms, each with a single vacancy, and N M workers,8 each looking for a job.
It is common knowledge that the joint output of Firm i and Worker j would be pij > 0. We
make no restriction on the output matrix, except that of genericity:
Assumption 1 There exists a unique matching of workers to rms that maximizes aggregate
output.
If Firm i hires Worker j at wage wij then the rms payo¤ is pij   wij; while the worker
obtains wij: For convenience, the outside options of both rms and workers are normalized to
zero.
The market operates as follows. In period 1, simultaneously and independently, each rm
makes a single o¤er to the worker of their choice. It costs c > 0 to approach a worker for the
rst time. Any subsequent o¤ers to the same worker are free.9 We assume that c < min pij;
7We consider the large body of models with non-transferable utility too far removed to discuss them in
this short overview.
8We analyze the case of N < M in Section 5.1.
9Think of c as the administrative cost of vetting a worker. We could easily extend the model to endogenize
a reason for vetting. Say, there is a small probability that the candidate is not suitable. For small vetting cost,
the optimal policy would be to vet candidates with a probability high enough so that an unsuitable candidate
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so that it does not discourage any match. The workers who receive (one or more) o¤ers either
accept one of those (in which case the rm whose o¤er has been accepted and the worker exit
the market) or reject all o¤ers. In the subsequent periods, the rms with unlled vacancies
keep making o¤ers to the available workers until all vacancies get lled. Firms and workers
discount the future by the common discount factor  2 [0; 1).
We start with the analysis of the simplecase of only two rms:
3 Duopsony
By Assumption 1 there is a unique e¢ cient matching. There are two possible cases: either
both rms weakly prefer their partner in the e¢ cient matching to the other one or not.
In the rst case rms have no incentive to compete, so we have a unique equilibrium with
the e¢ cient matching and zero prices. Therefore, we will concentrate our analysis on the
alternative scenario. Let us denote the rm whose preferences agree with e¢ ciency by H
and the other one by L: Also let the e¢ cient partner of H be denoted by h; and the e¢ cient
partner of L by l: Thus we have that
pLl + pHh > pLh + pHl (1)
and
pHh > pHl; pLh > pLl: (2)
We start our analysis by establishing the competitive benchmark: the hypothetical out-
come in a centralized, frictionless market. The dening characteristic of such an equilibrium
is that taking the equilibrium wages as given no rm would strictly prefer to hire a worker
di¤erent from the one it hires in equilibrium.
would be indi¤erent to chance getting caught (which would mean a utility loss for him). In that case c would
be the expected vetting cost (and with positive probability unsuitable workers would be hired). As long as
suitability were independent of productivity, interpreting N as the realized number of workers, there would
be no change in the equilibrium strategies.
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Proposition 1 In all competitive equilibria the matching is e¢ cient. Moreover, in the lowest-
wage competitive equilibrium wages are wcl = 0 and w
c
h = pLh   pLl.
Proof: First, note that both rms must hire a worker in competitive equilibrium. Next,
note that no rm will hire a worker who is not included in the e¢ cient matching. To see this,
note that otherwise there would be a worker included in the e¢ cient matching who did not get
hired. This worker and the rm who hired the worker o¤ the e¢ cient matching would both
be better o¤ trading with each other at the wage paid to the worker o¤ the e¢ cient matching.
Next, we show that matching must be positively assortative (PAM). Assume to the contrary
that Firm L hires Worker h (and thus Firm H hires Worker l): For this to be a competitive
equilibrium, we would need that no traders would like to switch partners at the going wages:
pLl wHl  pLh wLh and pHh wLh  pHl wHl; implying pHh pHl  wLh wHl  pLh pLl;
contradicting Assumption 1. Hence we must have PAM in equilibrium. Using the same logic
as before, PAM implies pLh pLl  wHh wLl  pHh pHl: Noting that the lowest individually
rational salary for Worker l is zero completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Now, the equilibrium in our decentralized market:
Proposition 2 The two-rm game has a generically unique subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE).
There exists a well-dened value, w 2 [0; wch + c); such that
i) if w  wch: L with probability Ll = pHh (pHl c) w
c
h
pHh (pHl c) ; o¤ers a zero wage to l; while with
the remaining probability it makes an o¤er to h; mixing with FLh (x) =
Ll
1 Ll
 x
pHh (pHl c) x
over the interval [w;wch]; H makes an exclusive o¤er to h; o¤ering zero with probability Z =
pLl(1 )+c
pLh (pLl c) w and with the remaining probability mixing with F
H
h (x) =
Z
1 Z  x wpLh (pLl c) x
over the interval [w;wch]: h accepts the highest o¤er she receives. l accepts the o¤er if he
receives it. Any rm that does not hire in the rst period, hires l for zero in the second.
ii) if w  wch : both rms o¤er zero to their e¢ cient match and these o¤ers are accepted.
Proof: First, note that in equilibrium no rm will make an o¤er that it knows will be
rejected, as both the direct and indirect costs of delay are positive and there is no option
value in waiting.
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Next, observe that in equilibrium H will bid exclusively for its favorite worker, h: To see
this, note that either L is bidding exclusively for l and hence h could be hired for free (as L
would hire l; so h has no credible threat of rejecting) what is the best possible outcome for
H; or L bids for h with positive probability. If L is bidding for h only, then H could hire l
for free, earning pHl; while outbidding10 L by " it could get, pHh  wLh   "; where we denote
the highest wage L o¤ers to h in equilibrium by wLh: As L prefers to bid for H; we must have
pLh   wLh  pLl. Together with (1) this implies that pHh   wLh > pHl; so H strictly prefers
to bid for h: Finally, consider the case where L is mixing over the target of its o¤er. This
would weaken the option of bidding for l higher wage needs to be paid and strengthen it
for h as there is not always competition for her.
If L does not bid for h; then Hs best response is to bid zero for h: This can only form part
of an equilibrium if any wage that L would be willing to hire h for namely, wLh  pLh  pLl
would be rejected by h: We will return later to this possibility. For the moment, let us
hypothesize that L bids for h with positive probability.
If L bids for h with positive probability then both L and H must use a mixed strategy
for their wage o¤ers to h (recall that the workers go with the more productive rm in case of
equal wage o¤ers). Standard arguments imply that both rms must mix on the same support,
which we denote by [w;w]; except that H may also bid zero possibly outside of this interval
in the hope that it is the only bidder (because L is bidding for l).11 It is straightforward to
see that the only additional possible mass points in the strategies are at w for L (and only
if H puts positive probability on zero) and w for H (as a mass point there for L could be
simply outbid by H):
We start by hypothesizing that H strictly prefers not to bid zero. In equilibrium, H will
obtain the services of h; if L either does not bid for her (what happens with probability bLl ) or
it o¤ers no more than whatH does: If H loses out in the rst period, it will hire l in the second
10If h prefers H no outbidding is necessary, matching the highest o¤er is su¢ cient.
11If h receives a single o¤er (from H) then l will accept his o¤er (from L), so in the continuation h will be
left alone with H; expecting a wage of zero. Consequently, the zero o¤er would be accepted in equilibrium.
10
period (for zero, as it will face no competition). When H o¤ers the maximum of the common
support, w; then it wins for sure. As it must be indi¤erent among all bids in the support of
its strategy, the following equality must hold for all x 2 [w;w]: (pHh   x)
hbLl + bLh bFLh (x)i+bLh h1  bFLh (x)i  (pHl   c) = pHh   w: Rearranging the equation, we obtain
bLl + bLh bFLh (x) = pHh   (pHl   c)  wpHh   (pHl   c)  x : (3)
Now, observe that bFLh (w) must be zero, since a bid of w could only win against the same o¤er
by H; but the best response of H to a mass point would be never to bid w, leading to
bLl = pHh   (pHl   c)  wpHh   (pHl   c)  w: (4)
As L could hire l for free, its bid for h is capped at pLh   pLl: Consequently, by (1), w 
pLh pLl < pHh pHl < pHh pHl; so bLl > 0 : L makes an o¤er to l with positive probability
as well.
Given that L is making an o¤er to both workers with positive probability, it must be
indi¤erent between making an o¤er to either of them. As it faces no competition for l, it
can hire him for zero, leading to (pLh   x) bFHh (x)+ h1  bFHh (x)i (pLl   c) = pLl , bFHh (x) =
pLl(1 )+c
pLh (pLl c) x for x 2 (w;w). Substituting x = w we obtain that bFHh (w) = pLl(1 )+cpLh (pLl c) w .
Note that this value is positive, as w < w  pLh   pLl < pLh   pLl. This would mean that
H makes an o¤er no greater than w with positive probability, which rationally can only be
an o¤er of zero, contradicting the hypothesis that it strictly prefers not to o¤er zero.
We thus know that in equilibrium H weakly prefers to o¤er zero to h. We drop the hats
of F and  to capture the change in strategy and denote the probability of making an o¤er
of zero by Z. As we have seen above, H must mix, so Z < 1:
H has to be indi¤erent between bidding zero (when it only wins if L does not bid for h;
and otherwise it hires l next period) and w (when it wins for sure), so we must have that
pHh
L
l +
 
1  Ll

(pHl   c) = pHh   w )
Ll =
pHh   (pHl   c)  w
pHh   (pHl   c) > 0: (5)
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By the same token, (3) without hatsas we have established that H bids zero with
positive probability must also hold for all x 2 [w;w]. Solving for the mixing distribution
we have
FLh (x) =
pHh   (pHl   c)  w
w
 x
pHh   (pHl   c)  x 2 (0; 1]: (6)
Given that L is making an o¤er to l with positive probability (see (5)), it must be indi¤erent
between making an o¤er to either worker. As it faces no competition for l, it can hire him for
zero, leading to (pLh   x)
 
Z + FHh (x)(1  Z)

+ (1  Z)  1  FHh (x) (pLl   c) = pLl ,
(1  Z)FHh (x) =
pLl(1  ) + c
pLh   (pLl   c)  x   Z; (7)
for x 2 (w;w). If there is no mass point at the upper end of Hs strategy, limx!w FHh (x) = 1;
then the formula still applies and we obtain that w = pLh   pLl. If there were a mass point,
then in order to keep L from overbidding it must be that for all " > 0; pLh   w   " < pLl
, w  pLh   pLl; which when applied to the formula for limx!w FHh (x); implies again that
w = pLh   pLl and FHh (w) = 1, therefore no mass point is possible. From (5), substituting in
for the upper bound, we obtain that Ll =
pHh (pHl c) wch
pHh (pHl c) :
When L bids the lower bound of its support, it can only win if H is bidding zero.
Hence, we have that (pLh   w)Z+ (1   Z)(pLl   c) = pLl; from which we can solve for
Z = pLl(1 )+c
pLh (pLl c) w 2 (0; 1): Substituting in (7), we obtain
FHh (x) =
x  w
wch   w
 pLl   (pLl   c)
pLh   (pLl   c)  x:
All we have left to do is to identify the lower bound of the support of the mixed strategies.
Observe that by the single deviation principle this has to equal the (discounted) expected
continuation value of h; when she receives two o¤ers12 and hence expects both rms to be
still in the market in the next period.
w

= eZeLh eFLh (w)w+Z ew
w
x
h efHh (x)(1  eZ)eLl + eLh eFLh (x)+ eLh efLh (x)( eZ + (1  eZ) eFHh (x))i dx:
(8)
12Whenever L o¤ers to h; she will receive two o¤ers, so this is the relevant scenario for the determination
of the lower bound of Ls bidding distribution.
12
Note that the probability distributions (and w) carry a tilde. This is because following two
bids for h; no vetting cost will have to be paid to make a new o¤er to h; tilting the competition
in favor of h and slightly modifying the formulas. It is crucial to observe though, that w is
invariant, as it is only dened following a history where both rms have paid their vetting
costs exclusively for h:
It is straightforward to see that up to (5) and (6) everything remains the same (except
for the substitution of ew for w) even after a sunk vetting cost for h: On the other hand, (7)
becomes (1  eZ) eFHh (x) = (pLl c)(1 )pLh (pLl c) x  eZ; which in turn implies that ew = wch+c; which then
leads to eLl = pHh (pHl c)  ewpHh (pHl c) and eLh = ewpHh (pHl c) : Similarly we have eZ = (pLl c)(1 )pLh (pLl c) w
and eFHh (x) = x wew w  (pLl c)(1 )pLh (pLl c) x :
Substituting into (8), we have
w

=
(pLl   c) (1  )
pLh   (pLl   c)  w 
pHh   (pHl   c)  ew
pHh   (pHl   c) 
w
pHh   (pHl   c)  ww +Z ew
w
(pLl   c) (1  )x
(pLh   (pLl   c)  x)2
 pHh   (pHl   c)  ew
pHh   (pHl   c)  x dx+ (9)Z ew
w
pHh   (pHl   c)  ew
(pHh   (pHl   c)  x)2
 (pLl   c) (1  )x
pLh   (pLl   c)  xdx:
After a bit of work13, this simplies to the following equation:
0 =
w (pHh   pLh   (pHl   pLl))
 (pLl   c) (1  ) (pHh   (pHl   c)  ew)  
w2 (pHh   pLh   (pHl   pLl))
(pLh   (pLl   c)  w) (pHh   (pHl   c)) (pHh   (pHl   c)  w)  
( ew   w) (pLh   (pLl   c))
(pLh   (pLl   c)  w) (pLh   (pLl   c)  ew) + (10)
( ew   w) (pHh   (pHl   c))
(pHh   (pHl   c)  w) (pHh   (pHl   c)  ew)  
ln
(pLh   (pLl   c)  ew) (pHh   (pHl   c)  w)
(pHh   (pHl   c)  ew) (pLh   (pLl   c)  w) :
The right-hand side of (10) is a continuous function of w; outside of [pLh   (pLl   c); pHh  
(pHl   c)] where it is not dened. Routine calculations show14 that it is increasing for
13Details are in the Mathematical Appendix.
14Details are in the Mathematical Appendix.
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w < pLh   (pLl   c); and that it takes a negative value at w = 0 and a positive value at
w = ew: Consequently, there is a unique feasible solution.
Finally, note that when w  wch; L has no (strict) incentive to bid for h; and as a result
we get the e¢ cient equilibrium with zero wages, as discussed above. When w = wch; both
equilibria exist. Q.E.D.
The two possible equilibrium congurations are strikingly di¤erent. One displays both
frictional unemployment as, because of Ls mixing over targets, l may not receive an o¤er
in the rst period and mismatch as, because of the mixed wage o¤ers to h, L may end up
hiring her. It is reminiscent of the equilibrium of ex ante wage setting, as analyzed in Bulow
and Levin (2006). The other conguration is fully e¢ cient, but leaves zero surplus for the
workers. Much along the lines of the equilibrium of ex post wage setting. Both outcomes give
below competitive expected wages to the better worker.
It is worthwhile to note that the mixed equilibrium when w = wch is not the Diamond
equilibrium, though it is only singly mixed, as the bids for h become pure strategy bids: L
bids wch and H bids zero. As L is still mixing over the target of its o¤er and when it bids
for h it wins for certain this equilibrium continues to be ine¢ cient.
Of course, the million-dollar question is: when, if ever, is w  wch? The following corollary
gives the almost complete15 answer.
Corollary 1 There exist 0 <    < 1; such that
i) for all  <  the unique SPE of the two-rm game is the mixed equilibrium identied in
Proposition 2;
ii) for all  >  the unique SPE of the two-rm game is e¢ cient, with wages equal to the
workersoutside options.
Proof: Note that the equation dening w; (10), is of the form g(w; ; A) = 0; where A
stands for the rest of the parameters. In the range w 2 (0; pLh   (pLl   c)); which includes
15We conjecture that  = , but have not been able to prove it yet.
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(0; wch + c) as c < pLl; g is continuous in ; which implies that so is w(): Consequently, it is
su¢ cient to show that lim!1w() > wch to prove ii). We actually show that lim!1w() =
wch+ c: To see this, assume to the contrary that lim!1w() < w
c
h+ c: That would imply that
lim!1 eZ() = 0: If H never bids zero then it cannot be part of an equilibrium for L to have a
mass point on the lower bound of its bidding range for h; as such a bid loses with probability
one. However, eFLh (w) = pHh (pHl c)  ewew  wpHh (pHl c) w does have such a mass point for any
w > 0, which leads to a contradiction.
To see i) just note from (8) that w is the product of  and a number no greater than ew.
Q.E.D.
That is, the relevant parameter is the discount factor. With patient players we have the
e¢ cient equilibrium, with impatient ones the ine¢ cient one. In the situations mentioned in
the introduction, we would expect the players to be rather patient, so the prediction favors
the Diamond equilibrium.
3.1 A numerical example
In order to provide a better feel for the nature of the equilibrium, we provide a numerical
example. Let pHh = 15; pHl = 10; pLh = 9; pLl = 6; c = 1; ) w = 3:
E¢ cient surplus: 15 + 6  2 1 = 19:
Mismatch surplus: 10 + 9  2 1 = 17:
The following table displays the main features of the equilibrium for di¤erent values of the
discount factor:
15
 Ll F
L
h (w) Z w
0 .80 0 .67 0
.5 .71 .27 .64 1.03
.8 .62 .63 .71 2.20
.9 .57 .89 .89 2.81
.92 .55 .98 .97 2.96
.93 1  1 3.04
2ZLh
.26
.38
.54
.77
.85
0
Lh ((1  )Ll+ c)
1.2
1.02
.76
.65
.66
0
The last two columns of the table are lower bounds16 on the dead-weight loss due to
mismatch and frictional unemployment, respectively.
4 The general case
The characterization of equilibria for a large number of rms is very complicated. As there are
multiple o¤ers received by many workers with positive probability, way too many subgames
are possible to allow a clean analysis.
Short of a full characterization, what we are really interested in is whether Corollary 1
generalizes to an arbitrary number of rms (and workers). While proving uniqueness has
eluded us, we can answer in the a¢ rmative: indeed, the Diamond equilibrium does (only)
exist in general for a high enough discount factor.
Proposition 3 There exist 0 < b  bb < 1; such that the general dynamic game has
i) a SPE which is e¢ cient, with wages equal to the workers outside options, if either the
e¢ cient match is the preferred match of all rms or   bb;
ii) no e¢ cient SPE, if  < b and the e¢ cient match is not the preferred match of all rms.
Proof: For convenience, we relabel the rms so that the e¢ cient matching involves Firm
i hiring the worker with the same index. Let us start with i). Consider a deviation by Firm
16We ignore the additional ine¢ ciency due to the mixing of o¤ers.
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J; making an o¤er to worker k 6= j: Since the equilibrium wages are zero, this can be only
protable if it prefers k to j: pjk > pjj: In order for k to accept, it is not enough to make
him a positive o¤er. Rather, he has to be o¤ered his continuation value in the subgame with
Firms J and K and Workers j and k (as, following the equilibrium strategies the rest of the
rms will have hired in the rst period). Note that, since the putative equilibrium matching is
strictly e¢ cient, pjk > pjj implies that pkk > pkj and thus Proposition 2 applies, with Firm K
playing the role of H: Therefore, by the proof of Corollary 1, the continuation value of Worker
k exceeds pjk   pjj; as  ! 1: Thus, for  high enough, Firm Js deviation payo¤ conditional
on Worker k accepting is pjk   (pjk   pjj + ") = pjj   ", less than its equilibrium payo¤, pjj:
We still need to check what happens if the deviant o¤er to Worker k is unacceptable. In that
case, Worker k would reject both of his o¤ers. In the continuation, by the proof of Corollary
1, Firm J would end up hiring Worker j for zero, just as in the putative equilibrium, but
su¤ering a delay cost and an extra vetting cost. Hence there exists no protable deviation for
any rm.
If a worker rejected his equilibrium o¤er, next period he would be faced with the same
rm, as all the other rms would have hired. He could not improve on his payo¤ as any
positive continuation payo¤ could be slightly undercut by the rm, and it would be in the
workers best interest to accept.
For ii), pick a rm who would prefer to hire a worker, which is not its e¢ cient match.
By Corollary 1i), for a discount factor low enough, it could make an acceptable o¤er to that
worker, which would improve on its equilibrium payo¤. Q.E.D.
Even in the absence of a uniqueness result, it is arguable that in a situation where the
same rms face each other repeatedly, like the job markets we model, they would coordinate
on the e¢ cient equilibrium, which maximizes their aggregate welfare.
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5 Variations
5.1 Workersmarket
In the main text for simplicity and realism we have maintained the assumption that the
number of rms did not exceed the number of qualied workers looking for a job. Here we
show that the existence of the Diamond equilibrium does not require a rmsmarket, it exists
in a workersmarket just as well. As before, the main insight comes from the set-up following
a unilateral deviation from the Diamond equilibrium, in this case a single worker (and several
rms). The generalization follows the same arguments of Corollary 1 and Proposition 3 from
there. As it will become clear the existence results are even stronger, as now we can identify
a single threshold in : On the other hand, when the productivities are close to each other,
we can have an equilibrium, which is still at monopsony wages, but with an ine¢ cient match.
Of course, the actual e¢ ciency loss is minimal, since the rms are of similar productivities.
Let us denote the rm that is most productive hiring the worker by H and the second
most productive rm by L: The corresponding outputs are pH and pL:
Proposition 4 The one-worker-many-rms game has the following set of SPE:
i) if pL  pL   c: L with probability L = pH pL+cpH does not make an o¤er, while with
the remaining probability it mixes its o¤er with FL(x) = pH pL+c
pL c  xpH x over the interval
[pL; pL   c]; H o¤ers zero with probability Y = c(1 )pL and with the remaining probability
mixes with FH(x) = x pL
(1 )pL c  cpL x over the interval [pL; pL   c]: The worker accepts the
highest o¤er she receives;
ii) if pL  pL   c: H; or any other Firm i such that pi  pH   c; makes the only o¤er,
which is zero and is accepted.
Proof: Let us begin the analysis, assuming that there are only two rms. Consider the
subgame where both rms have made an o¤er. If the worker rejects both, in the continuation
we have the equivalent of an asymmetric Bertrand competition (with a di¤erent tie-breaking
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rule). This leads to both rms o¤ering pL with probability one, and the worker taking Hs
o¤er.17 Consequently, the workers continuation value in this subgame is pL:
Let us return to the main game now. If L does not bid, then Hs best response is to bid
zero. This can form part of an equilibrium if and only if any wage that L would be willing to
pay namely, sL  pL   c would be rejected by the worker.
If L bids with positive probability then both L and H must use a mixed strategy for their
wage o¤ers (recall that the workers go with the more productive rm in case of equal wage
o¤ers). Standard arguments imply that both rms must mix on the same support, which we
denote by [s; s]; except that H may also bid zero possibly outside of this interval in the
hope that it is the only bidder. It is straightforward to see that the only additional possible
mass points in the strategies are at s for L (and only if H puts positive probability on zero)
and s for H (as a mass point there for L could be simply outbid by H):
We start by hypothesizing that H strictly prefers not to bid zero. In equilibrium, H
will obtain the services of the worker, if L either does not bid for her (what happens with
probability bL) or it o¤ers no more than what H does: If H loses out in the rst period, it
earns zero. When H o¤ers the maximum of the common support, s; then it wins for sure. As
it must be indi¤erent among all bids in the support of its strategy, the following equality must
hold for all x 2 [s; s]: (pH   x)
hbL + 1  bL bFL(x)i = pH   s: Rearranging the equation,
we obtain bL + 1  bL bFL(x) = pH   s
pH   x: (11)
Now, observe that bFL(s) must be zero, since a bid of s could never win against H; leading to
bL = pH   s
pH   x > 0: (12)
As L is assumed to make an o¤er with positive probability (12) implies that it must be mixing
between making an o¤er or not, and hence it must be indi¤erent. Therefore, (pL   x) bFH(x) 
c = 0 , bFH(x) = c
pL x : Substituting x = s we obtain that
bFH(s) = c
pL s . Note that this
value is positive, as w < w  pL   c. This would mean that H makes an o¤er no greater
17There is no mixing because the outside options are zero.
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than w with positive probability, which rationally can only be an o¤er of zero, contradicting
the hypothesis that it strictly prefers not to o¤er zero.
We thus know that in equilibrium H weakly prefers to o¤er zero. We drop the hatsof
F and  to capture the change in strategy and denote the probability of making an o¤er of
zero by Y . As we have seen above, H must mix, so Y < 1:
H has to be indi¤erent between bidding zero (when it only wins if L does not bid) and s
(when it wins for sure), so we must have that pHL = pH   s )
L =
pH   s
pH
> 0: (13)
By the same token, (11) without hatsas we have established that H bids zero with
positive probability must also hold for all x 2 [s; s]. Solving for the mixing distribution we
have
FL(x) =
pH   s
s
 x
pH   x 2 (0; 1]: (14)
Given that L is not making an o¤er with positive probability (see (13)), it must be indif-
ferent between making an o¤er or not. Thus we have (pL   x)
 
Y + FH(x)(1  Y ) c = 0,
(1  Y )FH(x) = c
pL   x   Y; (15)
for x 2 (s; s) : If there is no mass point at the upper end of Hs strategy, limx!s FH(x) = 1;
then the formula still applies and we obtain that s = pL   c. If there were a mass point,
then in order to keep L from overbidding it must be that for all " > 0; pL   s   "   c < 0
, s  pL   c; which when applied to the formula for limx!s FH(x); implies again that
s = pL  c and FH(s) = 1, therefore no mass point is possible. From (13), substituting in for
the upper bound, we obtain that L = pH pL+c
pH
:
When L bids the lower bound of its support, it can only win if H is bidding zero. Hence,
we have that (pL   s)Y   c = 0; from which we can solve for Y = cpL s 2 (0; 1): Substituting
in (15), we obtain
FH(x) =
x  s
pL   c  s 
c
pL   x:
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All we have left to do is to identify the lower bound of the support of the mixed strategies.
Observe that by the single deviation principle this has to equal the (discounted) expected
continuation value of the worker when she receives two o¤ers18 and hence expects both rms
to be still in the market in the next period. We have already established that this value is
pL: When pL   c  pL; it is not protable for L to make a bid when H is bidding for the
worker. However, we also have to consider the case that H is not bidding. By the same token
as above, when pH   c  pL; it is not protable for H to bid when L is bidding for the
worker. Thus, when pH   c  pL; we have both equilibria.
Let us consider now the case with more than two rms. We proceed in three steps.
First, we show that the above equilibria continue to be equilibria. Second, we show that no
equilibrium exists with more than two rms bidding with positive probability. Finally, we
check whether the rms bidding can be di¤erent from H and L:
Note that in the two-rm equilibrium L always expects zero net prot. When pL c  pL;
by making a bid that L also makes in equilibrium, any rm with a lower productivity can
only fare worse than L: By making a bid below pL the entrant would win with probability
YL and it would need to o¤er at least pi to be accepted. This leads to an expected gross
prot of pH pL+c
pH
 c
(1 )pL (1  )pi =
pH pL+c
pH
 pi
pL
 c < c: When pL   c  pL; pi   c  pi so
there is no room for a protable bid for the worker.
Next note that H can guarantee itself pH   pL, the amount it makes in the two-rm
equilibrium (for low ). Any other player who bids, must expect to recover the vetting cost,
c: Thus, if we had more than two bidders, the worker should expect a lower wage than with
two bidders, what is clearly impossible.
It is straightforward to see that if the two rms bidding were not H and L then the one
left out could outbid the intruder and expect strictly more than c: Finally, as we have seen
before, Firm i could be the only bidder as long as pH   c  pi . Q.E.D.
18Whenever L makes an o¤er; the worker will receive two o¤ers, so this is the relevant scenario for the
determination of the lower bound of Ls bidding distribution.
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5.2 Multiple vacancies per rm
In the main text we have made the simplifying assumption that each rm has a single vacancy.
As shown by Kojima (2007), this assumption is crucial for the results of Bulow and Levin
(2006), without it, competitive wages can be part of an equilibrium. Nonetheless, we can
show that in our model the assumption is indeed without loss of generality.
Corollary 2 Firms having multiple vacancies would not alter Proposition 3.
Proof: First note that no rm would try to compete with itself for a worker. So any
deviation from the Diamond equilibrium must involve a rm poaching a worker which in
equilibrium it would not hire. If such a deviation occurs, just as in the main model, all the
other workers will be hired, so in the continuation there will only be two vacancies of di¤erent
rms left. Q.E.D.
5.3 Holding on to an o¤er
In the main text we have assumed that workers had to respond to each o¤er immediately.
This is not very realistic, so here we demonstrate that the assumption is actually reducing the
number of equilibria, so it cannot be the reason for the existence of the Diamond equilibrium.
Corollary 3 Workers having several periods to ponder an o¤er would not destroy the Dia-
mond equilibrium.
Proof: We will show that the continuation value of a worker rejecting two o¤ers can only
improve with the workersoption to hold on to an o¤er. As a result, the incentives for a rm
to deviate from the Diamond equilibrium can only decrease. Recall, that in the continuation
there are only two workers who receive o¤ers. One of them has no competition for him, so
he has no incentive to wait. The other worker is supposed to accept the highest o¤er in
equilibrium If she decides to hold on to it, she must be better o¤ doing that, increasing her
expected payo¤. Q.E.D.
22
The intuition for this result is simple: the only reason to hold on to an o¤er (rather than
accept it right away) is the hope of receiving a better o¤er in the future. This can only
improve a workers payo¤. It does not happen on the equilibrium path as there are no suitors
left, while the e¤ect o¤ the equilibrium path only strengthens the equilibrium.
5.4 Full commitment to wage o¤ers
An alternative model of targeted wages is one where the rms make a single take-it-or-leave-
it o¤er to the worker of their choice, which she has to accept within t periods. The rm is
committed both not to make another o¤er to the same worker (ever) and not to approach
another worker while its o¤er is on the table.19
We start with a general result that equilibria with full commitment must involve simulta-
neous competition.
Proposition 5 With TIOLI o¤ers, in any SPE some worker must receive two simultaneous
o¤ers with positive probability.
Proof: Assume to the contrary, that there exists an SPE where each worker receives
a maximum of one o¤er on the equilibrium path. Then all these o¤ers would have to be
simultaneous, as they would be accepted immediately and hence any delay in making them
would be suboptimal. If all o¤ers are simultaneous and one per worker, then they must be
zero. But then there is an incentive to deviate and bid " for a better worker. The rm
whose worker is poachedcannot react, while the others hire their equilibrium worker, so
the worker would be compelled to accept. Q.E.D.
Note that Proposition 5 rules out both Diamond-type equilibria and the sequential-move
equilibria of Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008), where rms make o¤ers one after the other.
This shows that the assumption that leads to their results is the absence of discounting and
not the non-explosive nature of the o¤ers.
19Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008) make this assumption, with t =1 (and  = 1):
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In order to get a better feel for what equilibria with full commitment look like, we discuss
the case of a duopsony. When t is zero (exploding o¤ers) then the equilibrium is the same as in
the case without commitment (and low ), except that the mixing interval starts from zero, as
the continuation value of a worker is zero, since the o¤er explodes and next period she would
face a monopsony situation. When t > 0; the better rm would sometimes (for  high enough)
prefer to wait and see what the other rm has o¤ered to the better worker, as matching that
o¤er it would hire the worker for sure. However, anticipating this, the worker would accept
the rst o¤er she received, thereby bringing trade forward by one period. Consequently, t > 0
does not a¤ect equilibrium behavior.
As the only change is the zero lower bound for the mixing interval, the expected wage
of the better worker is lower with commitment than without it (as long as in the absence
of commitment the mixed equilibrium would prevail). However, the mismatch probability is
increased: note that the weaker rm before had a mass point at w. With that o¤er it won
if and only if the better rm bid zero. Now this same mass is distributed over (0; w]; while
the better rm redistributes the mass he had on (w;w] on to (0; w]: As a result, the weaker
rm sometimes will win when it bids in (0; w]; and it will win more often than before when
it bids in (w;w]: Consequently, the weaker rm and the weaker worker expect the same as
without commitment, the better worker is clearly worse o¤, while the e¤ect on the better rm
is ambiguous.
With more rms, the situation is less clear cut. If with positive probability there was
competition for a worker in the second period, she would consider sitting on her o¤er
(when t > 0). Of course, to keep the rst period o¤er being mixed otherwise there would
be no reason to wait and see what the o¤er was going to be we would need competition
with positive probability in the rst period as well. An additional factor is that a rm may
decide to wait, not in order to learn the realization of a mixed wage o¤er, but to learn the
realization of mixed targeting: a low productivity rm may want to wait and see if there was
a coordination failure, leaving some high productivity worker without suitors.
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6 Conclusion
This paper is about the nature of endogenous competition, where agents on one side of the
market have to decide which agents on the other side to compete for. In the presence of
heterogeneity, e¢ cient matching often requires the absence of direct competition, but the
latter would lead to monopoly rents, making the incentives to compete too strong to resist.
So, what can be done to drive such a market towards e¢ ciency? The surprising answer
is to di¤erentially increase the bargaining power of the passive side of the market: a local
monopsonist retains all of her bargaining power in equilibrium, but if she becomes the target
of a raidero¤ the equilibrium path the ensuing price competition drives the raiders
prots down. Thus, paradoxically, the increased bargaining power has an adverse e¤ect on the
passive side of the market, as it scares o¤ the competition for them. The beauty of the model
is that nothing untoward is required to achieve the above e¤ect: all we need is to empower
the bid takers to reject all their bids and send the game to the next period. The vetting cost
is only needed to ensure that the e¢ cient equilibrium appear for traders with nite patience.
The main purpose of this paper was to isolate the e¤ects of targeted o¤ers on the market
outcome, even at the cost of some loss of realism. It is important therefore to note that the
robust result is that the e¢ cient matching obtains and does so at below competitive wages,
not that there is no wage dispersion. It is easy to extend the model so that the wage vector is
increasing in productivity. Just assume that the workersoutside options are increasing with
their productivity. As long as the outside option grows at a lower rate than productivity, such
a change would not a¤ect the main conclusions. Similarly, a moderate level of uncertainty
about the level of outside options would lead to higher wages.
Finally note that other frictions, like (small) uncertainty about productivities, or non-
pecuniary preferences on part of the workers, would not destroy the e¢ cient equilibrium.
Their e¤ect would be the same on the two-rm continuation game as in the main game,
leaving the incentives to deviate una¤ected. The vetting cost is very special in this sense as
it has a di¤erent e¤ect on and o¤ the equilibrium path.
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7 Mathematical Appendix
7.1 Intermediate steps to get to (10) from (9):
Dividing across by the common factor in (9), we have
w
 (pLl   c) (1  ) (pHh   (pHl   c)  ew)
=
1
pLh   (pLl   c)  w 
w
pHh   (pHl   c) 
w
pHh   (pHl   c)  w +Z ew
w
x
(pHh   (pHl   c)  x) (pLh   (pLl   c)  x)2
dx+Z ew
w
x
(pHh   (pHl   c)  x)2 (pLh   (pLl   c)  x)
dx:
Using that
R
x
(a x)2(b x)dx =
b ln a x
b x
(a b)2   a(a b)(a x) the equation becomes
w
(pLl c)(1 )(pHh (pHl c)  ew)   w2(pLh (pLl c) w)(pHh (pHl c))(pHh (pHl c) w) =
pHh (pHl c)
(pHh pLh (pHl pLl))2

ln pLh (pLl c)  ew
pHh (pHl c)  ew   ln pLh (pLl c) wpHh (pHl c) w

+
pLh (pLl c)
pLh pHh+(pHl pLl) 

1
pLh (pLl c) w   1pLh (pLl c)  ew

+
pLh (pLl c)
(pHh pLh (pHl pLl))2

ln pHh (pHl c)  ew
pLh (pLl c)  ew   ln pHh (pHl c) wpLh (pLl c) w

+
pHh (pHl c)
pHh pLh (pHl pLl) 

1
pHh (pHl c) w   1pHh (pHl c)  ew

=
pHh (pHl c)
(pHh pLh (pHl pLl))2 ln
(pLh (pLl c)  ew)(pHh (pHl c) w)
(pHh (pHl c)  ew)(pLh (pLl c) w)+
pLh (pLl c)
pLh pHh+(pHl pLl) 
w  ew
(pLh (pLl c) w)(pLh (pLl c)  ew)+
pLh (pLl c)
(pHh pLh (pHl pLl))2 ln
(pHh (pHl c)  ew)(pLh (pLl c) w)
(pLh (pLl c)  ew)(pHh (pHl c) w)+
pHh (pHl c)
pHh pLh (pHl pLl) 
w  ew
(pHh (pHl c) w)(pHh (pHl c)  ew) =
1
pHh pLh (pHl pLl) ln
(pLh (pLl c)  ew)(pHh (pHl c) w)
(pHh (pHl c)  ew)(pLh (pLl c) w) 
w  ew
pHh pLh (pHl pLl)

pLh (pLl c)
(pLh (pLl c) w)(pLh (pLl c)  ew)   pHh (pHl c)(pHh (pHl c) w)(pHh (pHl c)  ew)

:
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Moving everything to the LHS and multiplying across by pHh   pLh   (pHl   pLl); we
obtain (10).
7.2 RHS of (10) is increasing on ( 1; pLh   pLl + c)
To enable Scientic Workplace, we eliminate the subindices, denoting pHh by H; pLh by h;
pLl by L and pHl by l:
x(H h (l L))
(L c)(1 )(H (l c) c h+L)   x
2(H h (l L))
(h (L c) x)(H (l c) x)(H (l c)) 
(h  L+ c  x)

h (L c)
(h (L c) x)(1 )(L c)   H (l c)(H (l c) x)(H (l c) h+L c)

 
ln (h (L c) h+L c)(H (l c) x)
(H (l c) h+L c)(h (L c) x) :
d( x(H h (l L))(L c)(1 )(H (l c) c h+L))
dx
=   1
( 1)(L c)
H h+L l
H+L c h+c l
d

  x2(H h (l L))
(h (L c) x)(H (l c) x)(H (l c))

dx
= x
H+c l
H h+L l
(H x+c l)2(h x L+c)20@ Hx  2Hh  2c22 + hx+ 2HL   2Hc   Lx   2ch+
2hl + 2cx   lx + 2Lc2   2Ll2 + 2cl2
1A
d( (h L+c x)( h (L c)(h (L c) x)(1 )(L c) 
H (l c)
(H (l c) x)(H (l c) h+L c)))
dx
=
H h+L l
(H x+c l)2(h x L+c)2 
c22 +Hh  x2  HL +Hc + ch   hl   Lc2 + Ll2   cl2
d(  ln (h (L c) h+L c)(H (l c) x)(H (l c) h+L c)(h (L c) x))
dx
=   H h+L l
(H x+c l)(h x L+c) .
Putting the terms together and dividing by H h+L  l > 0; (recall that H h > l L
by (1)):
  1
( 1)(L c)
1
H+L c h+c l +
x
H+c l
1
(H x+c l)2(h x L+c)20@ Hx  2Hh  2c22 + hx+ 2HL   2Hc   Lx   2ch + 2hl+
2cx   lx + 2Lc2   2Ll2 + 2cl2
1A
+ c
22+Hh x2 HL+Hc+ch hl Lc2+Ll2 cl2
(H x+c l)2(h x L+c)2   1(H x+c l)(h x L+c) :
Note that the last term is decreasing in x: Therefore we can bound it from below by
substituting the largest possible x = h  L+ c: The last term then becomes
  1
(H+L c h+c l)(1 )(L c) : Adding it to the rst term, we have
1
(L c)(H+L c h+c l) : This
is positive as long as H + L  c  h + c   l > 0; which holds by (1) and the fact that c <
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minfH;L; h; lg:We canmultiply the rest of the terms by (H   x+ c   l)2 (h  x  L + c)2 :
x
H+c l 

22(L  c)(c  l) + 2(H(L  c) + h(l   c)) + x(2c  l   L) + x(h+H)  2hH+
2(L  c)(l   c)  (H(L  c) + h(l   c)) +Hh  x2 =
2(L  c)(l   c)  (H(L  c) + h(l   c)) +Hh 1  2x
H+c l

+
x2
h
(2c l L)+h+H
H+c l   1
i
= (h  (L  c))(H   (l   c)  2x+ x2
H+c l )
The rst term is positive, the second is positive if x < H   (l   c): Finally, note that
H   (l   c) > H   l + c > h  L+ c; by (1) and (2). Q.E.D.
7.3 RHS of (10) is negative at x = 0:26664
x(H h (l L))
(L c)(1 )(H (l c) c h+L)   x
2(H h (l L))
(h (L c) x)(H (l c) x)(H (l c)) 
(h  L+ c  x)

h (L c)
(h (L c) x)(1 )(L c)   H (l c)(H (l c) x)(H (l c) h+L c)

 
ln (h (L c) h+L c)(H (l c) x)
(H (l c) h+L c)(h (L c) x)
37775
x=0
=

1
( 1)(L c) +
1
H+L c h+(c l)

(c  L+ h)  ln

 H+(c l)
h (L c)
c L+(L c)
H+L c h+(c l)

:
Now recall that ln y  1  1=y: Hence, the above no more than
1
( 1)(L c) +
1
H+L c h+(c l)

(c  L+ h) 

1 + h (L c)
H+(c l)
H+L c h+(c l)
( 1)(L c)

=
c L+h
( 1)(L c)   H+(c l)H+L c h+(c l)  

h (L c)
H+(c l)
H+L c h+(c l)
( 1)(L c)

:
Multiplying across by (L  c) (1  ) > 0 we get
L  c  h  (H+(c l))(L c)(1 )
H+L c h+(c l) +
h (L c)
H+(c l) (H + L  c  h+  (c  l)) =
(L  c) (1  )
h
1  H+(c l)
H+L c h+(c l)
i
+ h (L c)
H+(c l) (L  c  h) =
(L  c) (1  ) L c h
H+L c h+(c l) +
h (L c)
H+(c l) (L  c  h) =
(L  c  h)
h
(L c)(1 )
H+L c h+(c l) +
h (L c)
H+(c l)
i
;
the rst term is clearly negative, while the second is positive. Q.E.D.
7.4 RHS of (10) is positive at x = pLh   pLl + c:26664
x(H h (l L))
(L c)(1 )(H (l c) c h+L)   x
2(H h (l L))
(h (L c) x)(H (l c) x)(H (l c)) 
(h  L+ c  x)

h (L c)
(h (L c) x)(1 )(L c)   H (l c)(H (l c) x)(H (l c) h+L c)

 
ln (h (L c) h+L c)(H (l c) x)
(H (l c) h+L c)(h (L c) x)
37775
x=h L+c
=
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1
H+(c l)
(c L+h)2
c L+(L c)
H h+(L l)
H+L c h+(c l)   1( 1)(L c) (c  L+ h) H h+(L l)H+L c h+(c l) .
Dividing by the common positive term (c L+h)(H h+(L l))
H(h l)+c( 1) L(h l) :
1
( 1)  1c L + 1H+(c l) c L+h( 1)(L c) : Multiplying by (L  c) (1  ) :
1

  c L+h
H+(c l) =
H+(c l) (c L+h)
(H+(c l)) =
H (l L+h)
(H+(c l)) > 0. Q.E.D.
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